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INTRODUCTION

N this Survey period, the most interesting case decided involved
standing and the ability of parties to seek evidentiary hearings to
challenge environmental permits. A review of procedure, evidence,
standard of review, and of how the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ) determines if a party is an "affected person" who
thereby has standing presents important issues of environmental, administrative, and constitutional law. Another case addressed the meaning of
"public interest" for a Railroad Commission of Texas permit allowing injection of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing of oil and gas wells, and
thereby the scope of a challenge to the permit being issued by that
agency. The application of the statute of limitations to a party alleging
injury from air emission was addressed in a case where the plaintiff
claimed in response to an air emissions permit that she was being injured
ten years before filing suit. The role of environmental remediation and
value of property in eminent domain proceedings and the agreement of a
third party to remediate the contamination was presented in another
case.
A variety of other cases present challenging issues for companies and
the regulated community as well as those challenging the actions or the
alleged results of their operations.
II.

STANDING TO CHALLENGE ACTIONS THAT MAY
AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT

A.

DETERMINATION OF "AFFECTED PERSONS" FOR ASSESSING
REQUESTS FOR CONTESTED CASE HEARINGS UNDER
THE TEXAS WATER CODE

When a party applies for certain environmental permits, other parties
may object to the permit that the TCEQ is prepared to issue. Such objecting parties may request a trial-like hearing to present evidence as to
how the permit may not meet the requirements of the applicable statute
or the regulations promulgated under the statute. Prior to granting the
objecting party a contested case hearing, a threshold determination must
be made as to whether the party qualifies as an "affected person" with
standing to request such a hearing.1
The Water Code grants an explicit right to "request that the commission reconsider the Executive Director's decision or hold a contested case
hearing," but it is equally explicit in its requirement that any such request
may only be granted where "the commission determines that the request
1. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.556(c) (West 2001) (providing that the TCEQ
may only grant a request for a contested hearing if it is "filed by an affected person as
defined by Section 5.115.").
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was filed by an affected person as defined by Section 5.115. ' '2 Accordingly, the statute defines "affected person" to mean "a person who has a
personal justiciable interest related to a legal right, duty, privilege, power
or economic interest affected by the administrative hearing," going further to specifically exclude those claiming "[a]n interest common to members of the general public."'3 In rules promulgated pursuant to these
statutes, the TCEQ set forth non-exclusive, substantive criteria to guide
the determination of who qualifies as an "affected person" under the
4
statute.
The ability of the party to demonstrate that it is an affected person
determines whether it may obtain a hearing and effectively protest the
permit. Where the TCEQ is prepared to issue a permit, the agency may
avoid a hearing and issue a final permit to the applicant. For the applicant, a determination that the opposing party is not an affected party
eliminates the need to go through a long trial-like process, which is expensive, delays the permit, and in most cases prolongs the construction of
the new or expanded facility. The test for whether a party is an affected
person and procedurally how they can attempt to prove they meet the
test is thus critical for the contesting party, the party seeking a permit,
and the government agency administering the permitting program.
In the prior year's Survey, the City of Waco (City) was denied affected
party status by the Commission, and this decision was upheld by the Austin Court of Appeals. 5 Specifically, the court noted the evidence offered
by the Executive Director of the TCEQ to support the determination that
the proposed permit would reduce discharges of pollutants, even with an
increase in the number of cattle to be managed at the dairy. 6 The court
also cited evidence offered by the Executive Director related to the distance between the dairy and Lake Waco, and the assertion that the city's

2. Id. § 5.556(a)-(c) (West 2001); see also 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 55.201 (West
2012) (providing that "affected persons" may request a contested case hearing when authorized by law).
3. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.115(a) (West 2001).
4. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 55.203(c) (West 2012). The factors include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) whether the interest claimed is one protected by the law under which the
application will be considered; (2) distance restrictions or other limitations
imposed by law on the affected interest; (3) whether a reasonable relationship exists between the interest claimed and the activity regulated; (4) likely
impact of the regulated activity on the health and safety of the person, and
on the use of property of the person; (5) likely impact of the regulated activity on use of the impacted natural resource by the person; and (6) for governmental entities, their statutory authority over or interest in the issues
relevant to the application.
Id.
5. City of Waco v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-09-00005-CV, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 7692, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Sep. 17,2010), withdrawn City of Waco v. Tex.
Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 346 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
6. Id. at *16.
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interests are non-justiciable interests "common to the general public."'7
Based upon its review of the evidence before the Commission, the
court ultimately found "substantial evidence in the record to support the
Commission's determination that the City is not an 'affected person' for
purposes of this permit application and therefore its decision to deny the
City's hearing request."8
During this year's Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals withdrew the prior panel opinion and judgment dated September 17, 2010,
and substituted an opinion in which the court ruled that the City was an
affected person and thus must be allowed to challenge the permit in a
contested-case hearing as an affected person. 9 Thus, the City was allowed
standing in the permit hearing. 10 In another case involving the challenge
of a permit under the Water Code for another dairy, private landowners
were allowed to pursue a contested-case hearing as affected persons.1
In the second Waco case, the court ruled that the determination of
whether a party is an affected person is equivalent to the constitutional
principal of standing. 12 To demonstrate this status, a party must a have
"'real' . . . controversy," meaning the plaintiff has "sufficient personal
stake in the controversy" to ensure that the court is able to address a real
13
injury of the party seeking standing.
The court determined that the substantial evidence test applied in its
first ruling was inappropriate. 1 4 The application of the substantial evidence review could only be applied when a contested-case or adjudicative
hearing was conducted, where evidence was presented by both sides.1 5 In
addition, the failure to provide such a hearing may deny procedural due
process.' 6 The court applied an arbitrary or capricious standard and concluded as a matter of law that the TCEQ improperly denied standing to
the City.1 7 The Commission's conclusion that the amended permit was
more protective and that the City's interest would thus not be harmed
appeared to be a decision on the merits, which the court determined had
to be decided at a hearing on the merits, where the party seeking standing
could challenge the agency's evidence and present its own evidence.' 8
7. Id. at *17-18 (concluding there is "substantial evidence" in the record that "Lake
Waco's water quality is affected generally by discharge from a number of different sources,
including the City's own wastewater treatment plants.").
8. Id. at *18-19 (emphasis added). The dissent argues that given the scope of the
majority's review of the evidence, it has "leaped into the deep waters of the merits of the
case which cannot be resolved without a hearing." Id. at *54.
9. City of Waco v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 346 S.W.3d 781, 787-88 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
10. Id. at 827.
11. Bosque River Coal. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 347 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
12. City of Waco, 346 S.W.3d at 801-02.
13. Id. at 801-02.
14. ld. at 818.
15. See id. at 818-19.
16. Id. at 819.
17. Id. at 819-20.
18. Id. at 823-24.
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The question of the impact the run-off would have on Lake Waco's water
quality appeared to be one of the central issues on which the contestedcase would be conducted.1 9
In this lengthy opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals spent an incredible amount of effort to review prior case law and examine the ability of
the TCEQ-and potential agencies with similar procedural programs-to
determine a party's standing to contest agency decisions when a contested-case hearing is permitted. The court made an about-face from its
first decision in the case, where the agency was allowed to determine
whether a party had standing based on its consideration of evidence without an evidentiary hearing on the issue, which may be like a preliminary
hearing on jurisdiction or standing in a trial court. The opinion lays out a
clearer standard for determining whether an agency has acted properly in
making a preliminary decision on standing and what issues are more
likely to be left to a hearing on the merits. To what extent the TCEQ or
other agencies will adopt a process for preliminary hearings on standing
will remain to be seen.
In another case, with an opinion issued a couple of months later by a
different panel of judges on the Austin Court of Appeals, the court ruled
that a party that owns property downstream from another dairy and confined-animal-feeding lot had standing to contest a permit the TCEQ proposed to issue to the dairy.20 The second panel cited and relied upon the
Waco decision of the first panel.
Landowners in the watershed of the Bosque River lodged a challenge
against the Commission for issuing an amendment to a permit that allowed the dairy to increase its herd size from 700 to 999 and to apply
liquid and solid waste to fields. 21 Confined animal feeding has often resulted in opposition from neighboring landowners who complain of odors
and water pollution. The landowners in the Bosque River watershed,
where dairies have been locating and growing, asserted challenges to the
permit amendment. 22 The TCEQ denied the "affected person" status of
the contesting parties and issued the permit concluding that the application met the statutory and regulatory requirements. 23 The district court
24
in Austin reviewed and upheld the TCEQ decision.
The court decided the case along the lines of the Waco case. The court
ruled that the TCEQ could not generally review the terms of the permit
and conclude that, because the agency determined on general and not
specific evidence the permit would protect the parties seeking a contested-case hearing, those parties were not harmed and thus had no
19. See id. at 824-25.
20. Bosque River Coal. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 347 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
21. Id. at 368-69.
22. Id. at 370.
23. Id. at 372-73.
24. Id. at 372.
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standing to present evidence on the merits in a hearing. 25 Guided by the
Waco case, the court held that such conclusory decisions without any
26
form of hearing was improper, and a preliminary hearing was necessary.
It concluded the TCEQ's decision that the group seeking a contestedcase hearing was not an "affected person" was made through improper
27
procedure, was affected by error of law, and was an abuse of discretion.
The opinion lays out a clearer standard for determining whether an
agency has acted properly in making a preliminary decision on standing
and what issues are more likely to be left to a hearing on the merits. The
extent to which the TCEQ or other agencies will adopt a process for preliminary hearings on standing remains to be seen.
Within this context, it is interesting to compare the approach of the
TCEQ with the approach of the EPA in giving notice of a permit and
affording an opportunity for public comment. The EPA takes the public
comments it receives into account and decides whether to adjust the proposed permit. A contested-case hearing is not conducted, but the commenting parties may file suit in federal court to challenge the issuance of
the permit. Thus, the TCEQ arguably provides a great deal more procedural protections under the state approach than the EPA provides under
federal statutes. The TCEQ's approach to these cases was perhaps an
attempt to move toward an EPA-style process. The difficulty is that the
state statute provides an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing at the
administrative level rather than the judicial level. To what extent the
Texas legislature may at some point allow an EPA-style procedure may
depend on how strongly business interests may be able to argue that the
current permitting process is too lengthy and costly.
III.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS LIMITED INTERPRETATION

OF PUBLIC INTEREST UPHELD

The meaning of the term "public interest" was the focus of the Supreme Court of Texas in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens
for a Safe Future and Clean Water,which considered the permitting of an
injection well for the disposal of wastewater from the hydraulic fracturing
of oil and gas wells in the Barnett Shale. 28 Whether the term was to be
broadly or narrowly construed was largely determined by how the Texas
legislature addressed the meaning of "public interest" for injection wells
subject to regulation by the TCEQ. 29 The legislature added specific language to the statute relevant to TCEQ jurisdiction prior to the court case
challenging how the Railroad Commission of Texas (Commission) inter25. Id. at 378.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 381.
28. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens For a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336

S.W.3d 619, 621 (Tex. 2011).
29. Id. at 624.
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preted the term. 30 The level of deference courts in Texas are to give state
agencies when interpreting ambiguous terms was thus a central aspect of
the case. The Supreme Court of Texas determined that the Commission's
31
narrow interpretation was entitled to judicial deference.
As background, the case involved a challenge by a group of local citizens who objected to the permitting of a waste injection well.32 The principal objection was that the construction and operation of the well would
lead to significant traffic of heavy trucks transporting the waste to the
injection well. 33 The local citizens alleged that this heavy truck traffic
would be a nuisance and a threat to the safety of local citizens. 34 The
Commission ruled that the term "public interest" did not include evaluating issues such as the impact of increased truck traffic, but instead was
limited to the impact of the well on conservation of the state's oil and
natural gas. 35 Any consideration of broad public safety issues was, ac36
cording to the Commission, beyond their jurisdiction.
While the Austin Court of Appeals determined that public interest
should be construed broadly to include issues like the impact of heavy
truck traffic, the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed. The supreme court
first considered to what extent it should defer to an administrative
agency's interpretation of a term in a statute. 37 Where the language of a
statute is ambiguous, the supreme court cited precedent holding that it
should give "serious consideration" to an agency's interpretation of the
relevant statutory terms "so long as the construction is reasonable and
'38
does not contradict the plain language of the statute.
The supreme court determined that the term "public interest" was
vague or ambiguous, and thereby subject to agency interpretation. 39 One
of the critical issues that persuaded the supreme court that the Commission's interpretation was reasonable was the Texas legislature's amendment of the definition of "public interest" for purposes of injection wells
regulated by the TCEQ. 40 In 1987, the legislature amended the relevant
sections of the Texas Water Code that allows the TCEQ and the Commis41
sion to issue permits for injection wells under each agency's jurisdiction.
The legislature only amended the relevant sections within the TCEQ's
statutory jurisdiction, and specifically required the agency to consider the
effects of increased traffic from permitting on local roads and to ensure
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 630-31.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 628.
See id. at 626.
Id.
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that this is addressed or mitigated. 42 Prior to this amendment, the provisions governing industrial and oil and gas waste were the same for both
43
agencies.
The supreme court concluded that this specific addition to the industrial waste section within the TCEQ's jurisdiction without changes to the
oil and gas section under the Commission's jurisdiction demonstrated
that the legislature did not intend that the Commission take broad public
safety, and specifically truck traffic, into account when issuing oil and gas
injection well permits. 44 Beyond provisions relating to protection of fresh
water, the supreme court ruled that the Water Code in the relevant sections only discusses the conservation of oil and gas within Texas. 45 The
supreme court also considered the fact that the Commission's expertise is
oil and gas, not traffic safety or impacts of traffic on roads. 46 Finally, the
supreme court recognized the fact that the Commission 47has construed the
meaning of public interest in this way for many years.
The supreme court's decision resulted in upholding a limited and functional definition of "public interest" for the Commission. The long-held
interpretation was particularly convincing since the legislature did not
change it when amending the section of the Texas Water Code relevant to
the jurisdiction of the TCEQ. The legislature's decision to not amend the
specific factors the Commission must consider is probably the most important aspect of the case. Where legislatures specifically amend one part
of a statute but not another similar provision in that act, courts often
conclude the legislature intended through this omission to clarify the
meaning of the other unchanged section. To many courts interpreting
statutory language, it would then seem to go against the legislature in
interpreting the two sections in the same way after the amendment.
Courts look to the legislature to provide guidance as to meanings of statutory provisions and specific terms used by the legislature. Where the
legislature implicitly chooses to change one section and not another,
courts tend to conclude that decision has meaning and is not a mere oversight. With two provisions regulating wastewater disposal wells, and only
one amended by the legislature to require consideration of traffic impact,
the supreme court's conclusion is unsurprising.
IV.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

CHALLENGE TO

TCEQ's

ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES RELATED

TO WASTE MANAGEMENT

In a case involving the failure of property owners to dispose or store
waste in compliance with state waste management regulations, owners
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 631-32.

45. Id. at 627.
46. Id. at 630.
47. Id. at 632.
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fined by the TCEQ for such alleged violations failed to successfully challenge this penalty in court. 48 The parties argued that the state's environmental civil penalty policy was a rule subject to judicial challenge, that
the determination that the materials at the site were wastes was improper,
and that the TCEQ modifications to the administrative law judge's find49
ings were arbitrary and capricious.
The parties to the suit owned or operated activities at a property that
contained materials the TCEQ concluded were hazardous wastes.5 0 The
agency imposed a penalty of $177,500 on three parties on a joint and several basis. 5 ' After a contested-case hearing on the enforcement action,
the administrative law judge recommended a penalty of only $1,500.52

The parties then filed a challenge to the penalty decision in the district
court, which upheld the penalty as being supported by substantial evidence. 53 The parties appealed the district court's opinion to the Austin
Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals reviewed both the district court's decision and the
TCEQ's decision. The first issue was whether the policy the TCEQ staff
used to recommend a penalty to the administrative law judge, and on
which the administrative law judge and the Commission based their decision, was a "rule."' 54 The plaintiffs asserted that the penalty policy was in
effect a "rule" and challenged its legitimacy. 5 5 The challenge was based
56
on Section 2001.038 of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
For the court to have subject matter jurisdiction under this provision,
the penalty policy must be a rule. The APA defines a rule as:
(A) a state agency statement of general applicability that:
(i) implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy; or
(ii) describes the procedure or practice requirements of a state
agency;
(B) includes the amendment or repeal of a prior rule; and
(C) does not include a statement regarding only the internal management or organization of a state agency and not affecting private rights or
57
procedures.
The plaintiffs alleged that the penalty policy has a binding effect on
private parties and the staff of the TCEQ are bound to follow the policy.58 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court was presented
evidence that the TCEQ Commissioners were not bound by the policy in
48. Slay v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex. App.-Austin
2011, pet. denied).
49. See id. at 543-44.
50. Id. at 535-36.
51. Id. at 542.
52. Id. at 540.
53. Id. at 542-43.
54. Id. at 543.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(6) (West 2008).
58. Slay, 351 S.W.3d at 546.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

determining the final penalty to be imposed on parties under relevant
environmental statutes, and that the policy states that it is to be used for
the staff to recommend penalties to the Commission.5 9 The appellate
court agreed with the district court that the penalty policy did not bind
the Commissioners and did not impose specific burdens on private
60
parties.
The plaintiffs also challenged the order assessing civil penalties on
three other grounds. The challenges were based on Section 2001.174 of
the APA. 61 Under this provision, an agency decision may be reversed or
remanded if the governmental action was:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the
reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
62
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
The first challenge under this provision was that the material in question was not a "waste." Observations by a TCEQ staff member and analytical testing indicated the material was a waste and contained chemicals
that would cause the material to be regulated. 63 The court concluded this
was a reasonable basis to support the agency's conclusion that the mate64
rial was regulated as a waste.
The plaintiffs also argued the application of the penalty policy adopted
65
in 2002 to alleged violations in 1999 was a retroactive application of law.
Because the court concluded that the policy did not have legal effect, no
66
retroactive application of law was deemed possible.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the Commissioner's findings and conclusions of law by the administrative law judge were improper. 67 The
TCEQ is allowed to overturn any findings of fact as long as the amendment is "based solely on the record," and is "accompanied by an explanation of the basis of the amendment. '68 The changes in the number of
violations and the counting of violations at individual sites on the property as opposed to a facility-wide approach was not deemed to lack sufficient evidence or to be arbitrary and capricious, but was within the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 547-48.
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §

2001.174 (West 2008).

Id.
Slay, 351 S.W.3d at 549-50.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.047(m) (West 2008).
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69
statutory discretion of the TCEQ.
70
The Austin Court of Appeals upheld the use of the penalty policy.
However, to the extent the agency applies the policy as if it is binding, it
may appear to be more like a rule than a mere unbinding policy. Agencies will often impose policies on regulated parties inflexibly and in many
cases it may be used much like a rule. Thus, the court's decision and
analysis may not be comforting to parties who are being regulated or penalized under what the policy states is only guidance. One would hope
that when the facts show such a situation, the courts will address these
issues under the APA and require the agency not to impose rule-like impacts from policies that do not follow the procedures required under the
APA and relevant environmental statutes before adopting rules binding
on regulated parties expressly, implicitly, or in practice.

B.

JURISDICTION OF TEXAS COURTS TO INTERVENE IN TCEQ
ENFORCEMENT AcTIONS UNDER THE TEXAS WATER CODE

The Texas Water Code establishes that the TCEQ is the principal authority in the state on matters relating to the quality of water in the state,
and the agency has exclusive jurisdiction to undertake legal proceedings
to compel compliance with the code. 71 In Vickery v. Stanley, the Tyler
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the status of the TCEQ as the primary
venue for enforcement actions under the Water Code and clarified the
limited scope under which Texas courts may hear challenges to the
TCEQ's primacy. 72 Hearing an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
denial of the plea to jurisdiction entered by the TCEQ Executive Director, the court of appeals reversed the trial court determination that it had
jurisdiction over the suit brought by a respondent subject to a TCEQ
73
enforcement action.
In 2008, approximately thirteen years after the agency initially identified violations relating to an underground storage tank (UST) system located on property owned by C.M. Stanley, Jr. in Gregg County, Texas,
the Executive Director recommended that the TCEQ order Stanley to
pay an administrative penalty and bring his facility into compliance with
the Water Code. 74 In March 2009, Stanley filed a declaratory judgment
action in the Gregg County District Court, and the trial court granted his
motion to abate the TCEQ enforcement action while the trial court action was pending. 75 When the trial court also denied the Executive Director's plea for jurisdiction, the interlocutory appeal to the court of
69. Id.
70. Id. at 551.
71. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.127 (West 2008); see also TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 7.002 (West Supp. 2010).
72. Vickery v. Stanley, No. 12-09-00408-CV, 2010 WL 4638714, at *1 (Tex. App.Tyler Nov. 17, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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appeals was filed. 76
The Executive Director first argued that sovereign immunity barred
the trial court's jurisdiction over Stanley's suit because Stanley failed to
allege any act on the part of the Executive Director that was in fact ultra
vires, triggering an exception to sovereign immunity protection. 77 Generally, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) is not a blanket
waiver of sovereign immunity that can be used as a vehicle to obtain declarations for relief against the state. 78 Stanley argued, however, that sovereign immunity should not apply because the Executive Director had
acted outside of his authority when he "determined" that Stanley was the
"owner" of the UST subject to TCEQ enforcement action. 79 As stated
by the court: "A party may employ a declatory judgment action to intervene in administrative proceedings when an agency is exercising authority
beyond its statutorily conferred powers. '' 80 This exception only applies,
however, if the suit alleges, and ultimately proves, that the officer or
agent was not merely exercising her discretion, but rather that she "acted
without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act."'8 1
The Tyler Court of Appeals assessed the Executive Director's actions
within the context of the statutory authority granted under the Water
Code.82 It noted that the "policy of the state [is] to maintain and protect
the quality of groundwater and surface water," and the "TCEQ is the
principal authority in [Texas] on matters relating to the quality of water
and . . . for setting water quality standards. '83 Among the matters
within its purview to achieve the stated policy, the TCEQ may develop
regulatory programs regarding USTs under the Water Code, 84 and it
"may institute legal proceedings to compel compliance" with the statute. 85 Under this statutory framework, the court of appeals found that
the Executive Director had not determined Stanley was the owner of the
UST in naming him as the respondent. 86 Instead, the Executive Director
had merely alleged that Stanley was the owner-an allegation supported
by the fact that the USTs were located on Stanely's land and that Stanley
has day-to-day control of the UST system. 87 Because the Executive Director had both the discretion and the legal authority to pursue enforcement proceedings against Stanley, he did not commit an ultra vires act
76. Id.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id. (citing State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 360 (Tex. App.-Austin
2009, pet. denied)).
79. Id. at *3.
80. Id. at *2 (citing Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Montemayor, 86 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, no pet.)).
81. Id. (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.341, 26.023, 26.127 (West 2008)).
84. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.345 (West 2008).
85. Vickery, 2010 WL 4638714, at *2 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.002 (West
Supp. 2010)).
86. Id. at *3.
87. Id. (citing to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.342(a) (West 2008)).
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owner, meaning the Executive Director
when he alleged Stanley was the 88
retained his sovereign immunity.
The second argument the Executive Director made against the trial
court's exercise of jurisdiction over Stanley's suit was that the TCEQ has
exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of USTs. 89 Here, the court of
appeals again recognized the limited scope of the UDJA, finding that it
"cannot be invoked when it would interfere with some other entity's exclusive jurisdiction." 90 Instead, where "an agency has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, a party must first exhaust administrative
remedies before a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction." 91
An agency is recognized as having exclusive jurisdiction when a "pervasive regulatory scheme" indicates that the legislature intended for the
regulatory process at issue to be the "exclusive means of remedying the
problem to which the regulation is addressed. ' 92 In this case, the appellate court noted that under the Water Code, the TCEQ has the authority
to develop a regulatory program regarding USTs; it may institute legal
proceedings to compel compliance with the Water Code, which can include holding hearings in which it receives evidence, makes decisions, and
issues orders to enforce the provisions of the Water Code; and it may levy
administrative penalties against those violating the Water Code. 93 Based
upon its assessment of the statutory framework under the Water Code,
the court found that this framework represents a "comprehensive scheme
intended by the legislature to be the exclusive means of remedying the
problem of contamination of ground water by use of USTs."'94 Accordingly, the TCEQ has exclusive jurisdiction over compliance with the
Water Code, meaning Stanley and other respondents must exhaust their
administrative remedies through TCEQ enforcement proceedings before
a trial court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a related
matter. 95
V.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL TORT SUITS

ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY REGULATORY PERMITS ARE NOT
SHIELDED FROM SUBSEQUENT CIVIL LIABILITY

A permit holder can typically avoid enforcement actions by operating
within the scope of a state-issued permit, yet those same operations may
also give rise to civil actions outside of the context of regulatory enforce88. Id.
89. Id. at *4.
90. Id. (citing MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669
(Tex. 2009)).
91. Id. (citing Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221
(Tex. 2002)).

92. Id.
93. Id. (citing to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 7.002, 7.051(a), 26.019-020, 26.345 (West
2008)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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ment. In FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, the
Supreme Court of Texas injected itself into the question of whether a
state-issued permit offers blanket immunity from civil claims arising from
actions that otherwise fall within the scope of permitted activities. 96 After the Beaumont Court of Appeals disregarded conflicting decisions
from each of the Austin and Amarillo Courts of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of Texas resolved the emerging appellate court conflict to confirm
that a state-issued permit does not immunize the permit holder from civil
97
liability for actions arising out of the use of the permit.
In 1996, Environmental Processing Systems (EPS) obtained a permit
from the TCEQ's predecessor to drill and operate a wastewater injection
well on land adjoining property owned by FPL Farming (FPL).98 Around
three years later, EPS successfully amended its permit to increase the allowed injection rate. 99 In 2006, FPL filed suit against EPS in Liberty
County alleging various causes of action, including trespass, negligence,
and unjust enrichment. 10 0 When the trial court denied FPL's motion for
a new trial after the jury found for EPS, FPL appealed to the Beaumont
Court of Appeals. 1° 1 On appeal, the court of appeals rejected the claims
forwarded by FPL, deciding as a threshold matter that FPL could not
pursue a trespass claim against EPS when the TCEQ had approved a
1 02
permit allowing the very conduct FPL alleges resulted in harm.
This decision directly conflicted with two prior decisions issued separately by the Austin Court of Appeals and the Amarillo Court of Appeals. In deciding an earlier challenge to the EPS permit from FPL, the
Austin Court of Appeals explicitly held that the EPS permit did not impair FPL's rights.10 3 Although it allowed the amended permit, the court
concluded that FPL could seek damages from EPS if the waste plume
from the permitted well were to migrate into FPL's property and cause
harm. 10 4 Relying in part on the decision in FPL Farming, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals reached a similar determination in a separate matter,
concluding that securing a permit from the Railroad Commission "'does
not immunize the recipient from the consequences of its actions if those
actions affect the rights of third parties.'"105
The Supreme Court of Texas sided with the latter decisions, finding
that the reasoning of the Beaumont Court of Appeals was "inconsistent
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 307 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 309-10 (citing FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n, 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 6, 2003, pet.

denied) (mem. op.)).
104. Id. at 310 (citing FPL Farming, 2003 WL 247183, at *5).
105. Id. (quoting Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2009, no pet.)).
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with [the supreme court's] general view of the legal effect of an agency's
permitting process. 10 6 It held that because a permit is a "negative pronouncement" offering no affirmative rights to a permittee, a permit
granted by an agency "does not act to immunize the permit holder from
civil tort liability from private parties for actions arising out of the use of
the permit. 10 7 The negative pronouncement of the permit removes a
"government imposed barrier" to the activity requiring the permit, allowing the permittee to proceed under the conditions imposed.1 0 8 In the
case of the injection well, the permit allowed EPS to proceed with drilling
the well and injecting permitted fluids pursuant to its terms. 10 9 In issuing
the permit, however, the TCEQ was not authorized to determine ownership of the deep subsurface or to determine whether any authorized migration resulting from permitted activities would invade private property
rights. 110 More significantly, the statute authorizing the TCEQ to issue
the permit in question specifically provides that "'[tlhe fact that a person
has a permit issued under this chapter does not relieve him from any civil
liability.'"' 11 In other words, the permit is not a "get out of tort free
112

card."

Finally, the Supreme Court of Texas also rejected the Beaumont Court
of Appeals' application of two prior supreme court decisions to its consideration of the FPL claim. The court of appeals had applied both Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Manziel and Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust to support its conclusions that injections authorized by
state-issued permits cannot result in trespass.' 1 3 Both Manziel and Garza
involved the injection of substances pursuant to an agency authorization
that had possibly migrated underground across property lines.' 14 The supreme court drew a clear distinction, however, noting that both Manziel
and Garza dealt with the extraction of minerals and the rule of capture.1 15 It noted that the injection of substances to recover minerals
"serves a different purpose than does injecting wastewater."1 16 Likewise,
while mineral owners can protect their subsurface interests from drainage
through pooling or drilling their own wells, the same is not true of land-7
owners seeking to protect their subsurface from migrating wastewater.1
106.
107.
1943)).
108.
109.

Id.
Id. (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 170 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex.
Id. at 310-11 (citing Magnolia Petroleum, 170 S.W.2d at 191, 243).
Id. at 312.

110. Id. (referencing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.003 (West 2008)).

111. Id. (quoting TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.104 (West 2008)). The court also noted
that the related regulations explicitly provide that "the issuance of a permit does not authorize any injury to persons or property or an invasion of other property rights." Id.
(quoting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.122(c) (West 2008)).

112.
113.
Coastal
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 311.
Id. at 313; R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1962);
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008).
FPL Farming, 351 S.W.3d at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Accordingly, the supreme court confirmed that the rule of capture and
related jurisprudence are not applicable to claims brought for damages
118
alleged to have been caused by wastewater injection.
B.

FILING OF AIR EMISSIONS TORT SUIT RULED BEYOND
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A number of lawsuits have been lodged over the years alleging that
cement kilns in Midlothian, Texas were causing injury to people or property as a result of air emissions from those facilities. The TCEQ and EPA
have investigated these allegations. One of these suits was recently heard
by the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District. 119 The case
was based on nuisance, trespass, negligence, and gross negligence-typical claims in environmental tort cases. As is also fairly common in these
types of cases, the defendant argued the defense of statute of limitations.
The court ultimately ruled that the plaintiff had failed to timely file the
suit, as she had been told of the potential for the emissions to cause the
alleged injury more than two years before suit was filed.
The plaintiff, a landowner named Debra Markwardt, brought suit
against Texas Industries (TXI). She alleged that emissions since the mid1980s had caused her and her dogs health problems, damages to her property, and lost profits in her dog breeding business. 120 In the trial court,
Markwardt attempted to avoid the statute of limitations defense by asserting the discovery rule, a provision under the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
the continuing tort doctrine, and fraudulent concealment by the defendant. 121 These are typical claims that plaintiffs assert to attempt to avoid
a statute of limitations defense in environmental tort cases. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of TXI, and Markwardt
appealed.
On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals considered the application
of limitations for a permanent versus temporary nuisance. The Supreme
Court of Texas has addressed how Texas courts should analyze statutes of
limitations in tort cases where a nuisance claim and similar claims are
asserted.12 2 The analysis begins with the question of the application
of
23 If it
the discovery rule to when the plaintiff's cause of action accrues.'
is a permanent nuisance, then the claim is barred if the plaintiff did not
file suit within two years of when he or she knew of the alleged injury or,
exercising reasonable due diligence, should have known of the injury and
118. See id.
119. Markwardt v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 325 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 882.
123. Id.
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the facts giving rise to the injury. 12 4 A temporary nuisance accrues each
time an injury occurs, and a party may recover for two years back from
1 25
the date of filing suit.
In this case, the court ruled that the nuisance was a permanent nuisance because it was constant and continuous and not temporary or intermittent, which can be shown by the plaintiff's injuries or the defendant's
operations. The key is whether the events are likely to occur again and
whether the future injury can be reasonably determined. Markwardt alleged that TXI had been burning hazardous waste in its cement kiln since
1987 or 1988, and she had protested air emissions permits sought by TXI
in 1997 and 1998. Markwardt's alleged health and property injuries were
long lasting as well. As a result, the court ruled that the nuisance alleged
was properly classified as permanent, and the general discovery rule ap126
plied, which the plaintiff had missed by several years.
In addition to asserting the discovery rule and a temporary nuisance to
attempt to avoid limitations, plaintiffs in environmental tort suits frequently assert that a CERCLA provision, continuing tort theory, and
other defenses apply. The CERCLA provision provides a federal commencement date for claims arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, such that the running of limitations
does not begin until the plaintiff knew or should have known that the
injuries alleged were caused or contributed to by the relevant hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant. 12 7 Markwardt had claimed ten
years earlier, in protesting TXI's air permit, that the air emissions were
28
causing her injuries.'
The plaintiff made other assertions to avoid the statute of limitations,
namely continuing tort and fraudulent concealment. Prior decisions have
held that the defense of continuing tort is based on the view that the
plaintiff does not know what is causing her illness, whereas Markwardt
asserted the air emissions were causing her injury.' 29 Markwardt, in asserting fraudulent concealment, claimed that the TCEQ and EPA concluded there was no harmful effect by the investigations, permitting
proceedings, and other statements or actions that the emissions were not
harmful, and TXI hid the effects of the emissions.l 3° The plaintiff failed
to assert any evidence showing the defendant knew of and had concealed
the alleged harm; she also asserted she was being harmed by TXI emis13
sions, so she could not allege reliance on any alleged concealment. '
124. Id. (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 270, 274-75 (Tex.
2004); HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998); S.V. v. R.V., 933
S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 883-86.
42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006).
Markwardt, 325 S.W.3d at 891-92.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 895-96.
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Thus, the court rejected the fraudulent concealment assertion.1 32
The plaintiff's attempts to avoid the statute of limitations defense were
not likely to succeed given that she had asserted injuries ten years before
suit was filed. As this case demonstrates, the Texas law in the area of
limitations and the means by which plaintiffs may attempt to avoid limitations is becoming more settled law. The discovery rule and the extent to
which the nuisance, injury, or defendant's operations were permanent or
temporary will force plaintiffs who have delayed filing for two years from
discovering the activities existence to either lose their claims or, in rare
cases, to limit them to any injuries occurring within two years of filing
suit. Markwardt appears to be a clear case of the plaintiff missing her
limitations period by waiting too long to file suit.
VI.

A.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, EMINENT DOMAIN,
AND TAKINGS

ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION AGREEMENT IMPROPERLY
EXCLUDED FROM EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING
TO DETERMINE VALUE OF LAND

When governmental agencies take property through eminent domain,
disputes often arise regarding the value of the property being taken.
With contaminated properties, the process of determining value is complicated by the potential liability for remediating the property to governmental standards and, if the contamination has migrated off-site, the cost
of remediating that property and the potential for lawsuits asserting property damage and personal injury. The extent to which these concerns are
real or the potential actual impact on the value of land are often at issue
in negotiations or litigation between the landowner and the governmental
entity taking title to the contaminated property.
The problem of valuing contaminated property arose in the case of a
landowner whose property had been contaminated by a former tenant
engaged in oil and gas drill tool fabrication and repair. 13 3 The current
landowner bought the property for $487,000 in 1995.134 In 1996, the prior
owner entered into an agreement with the former tenant whereby the
tenant would address any environmental remediation required by the relevant governmental agencies based on the tenant's proportional responsibility for the contamination. 135 Thus, the landowner would not likely
incur the costs of environmental remediation.
During the trial, the district court excluded the environmental remediation agreement and testimony about it. The trial court also excluded
other testimony regarding the contamination and testimony that the
property was worth $11.5 million without taking contamination into con132. Id. at 896.
133. See generally Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State, 328 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 921-22.
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sideration. 136 The state presented evidence that the property was worth
$3.3 million in an uncontaminated condition. 137 Because the state's evidence was that the remediation would take eight years, the property
value was discounted to a present value of about $800,000, and over
$100,000 was subtracted for demolition of buildings. 138 The final price
based on the state's appraiser's testimony was $681,251-a tremendous
difference from the $11.5 million estimated by the landowner's
139
appraiser.
The jury ultimately returned a verdict that the market value of the
property was $4.5 million. 140 The landowner had been paid $6,459,500
based on the administrative process regarding value prior to the appeal to
the district court. 141 The district court ordered the landowner to pay the
state $2,872,000.142
On appeal, the appellate court first ruled that exclusion of evidence of
the prior tenant's liability for and indemnity agreement to cover the environmental contamination costs was reversible error. 143 The court specifically held that if a party relies on evidence of environmental
contamination in connection with setting the market value of property,
then the existence of a third party agreement to remediate the contamination is relevant and admissible in the proceeding to determine the fair
market value of the property. 144 The state attempted to argue that its
actual argument and evidence was that the delay in construction for many
years while the contamination was being remediated resulted in the disas it found no evicounted value.' 45 The court rejected this argument
14 6
dence in the case to support the state's claim.
The Houston Court of Appeals then rejected the state's argument that
any error was harmless because evidence of the value of the property was
provided in the case at an uncontaminated value and one piece of evidence that the state presented showed the annual environmental
remediation cost was $0.147 The court found that the environmental
remediation agreement was so important for determining the value of
contaminated property that without presenting it and having witnesses
and experts testify about the property, however, and its value, the exclusion of the agreement was harmful error.1 48 As a result,49 the court re1
versed and remanded the case back to the district court.
136. Id. at 924.

137. Id. at 925.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

930-31.
930.
930-33.
932-33.
933.
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Clearly, an agreement by a third party to remediate the property or
indemnify the property owner would be critical for determining value of
property. Of course the financial ability of the counter party/indennitor
to pay the costs would be critical as well. In this case, it did not appear
that the counterparty was in any financial difficulty, and it seemed to be
of sufficient size and wherewithal to pay the costs of investigation and
remediation. 150 In fact, the former tenant was conducting the remediation, and allegedly the state was obstructing the remediation.' 51 The argument centering on the delay in ability to contaminate the property was
ironic if in fact such obstruction was occurring. In many cases, development may take place even though the property is contaminated and undergoing remediation. For groundwater contamination, this may be
especially true depending on the footprint of the new building or other
structures and the location of necessary remediation and monitoring
wells.
Environmental liabilities are more and more important in eminent domain cases. Contamination can often affect property value. The level of
contamination and the degree to which remediation is actually required
depends on the actual levels of contaminants in soil and groundwater.
The extent actual soil removal or treatment in place is required and
whether remediation of groundwater contamination is actually required
under applicable regulations are other key considerations. Evidence of
these issues proves important in negotiations and proceedings that determine the amount of money a governmental entity must pay a landowner
to take their property.
B.

TAKINGS VERSUS TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-THE PROPER
MECHANISM FOR CHALLENGING DETERMINATIONS

REGARDING NAVIGABILITY OF
TEXAS WATERWAYS

The Texas Constitution makes clear that "[n]o person's property shall
be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person. 1 52 In Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. Sawyer Trust, the
Supreme Court of Texas addressed the confluence of claims for takings
and trespass to try title in the context of determinations by the Texas
Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) regarding the navigability of
Texas waterways. 153 After both the trial court and the Amarillo Court of
Appeals denied the plea to the jurisdiction forwarded by the TPWD, the
Trust could not asSupreme Court of Texas reversed, finding the Sawyer
154
sert a takings claim given the underlying facts.
150. Id. at 923-25.
151. Id. at 927.
152. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
153. See generally Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 386
(Tex. 2011).
154. Id.
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The Sawyer Trust owns a parcel of property in Donley County that is
traversed by the Salt Fork of the Red River. 155 When the trust had the
opportunity to sell sand and gravel from the streambed in question, it
sued the TPWD for a declaratory judgment that the waterway was not
navigable. 156 The TPWD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and while the
matter was pending, the parties agreed that a surveyor from the General
Land Office would survey the waterway to determine if it was navigable. 157 The surveyor concluded that the waterway was navigable, at
which point the Sawyer Trust amended its pleadings and added an allegation that the navigability determination constituted a taking of its property under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. 158 After the trial court
denied TPWD's plea to the jurisdiction, the court of appeals affirmed,
finding that because the claim was not an action for the recovery of
money from the state or for determination of title, sovereign immunity is
not implicated. 159
On appeal to the supreme court, the TPWD argued that Texas law does
not provide a general right to sue a state agency for a declaration of
rights. 160 The supreme court agreed, reaffirming its position that the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) is not a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity that can be used as a vehicle to obtain declarations for relief
against the state unless the claim is one for which the Texas legislature
16
has waived sovereign immunity. '
For its part, however, the Sawyer Trust urged that no waiver was necessary because the suit was based on a constitutional taking.' 62 The supreme court ultimately resolved this question by contrasting the nature of
a takings claim against a claim for trespass to try title. 163 As a general
rule, the sole method for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real
property in Texas is a trespass to try title claim under the Property
Code. 164 A plaintiff in such a claim sues to recover "immediate possession of land unlawfully withheld," with a remedy of title to, and possession of, the real property at issue. 165 Takings claims, on the other hand,
involve claims for compensation stemming from actions by the defendant
that resulted in taking, damaging, or destroying property for public use
without the owner-plaintiff's consent. 166 Ultimately, where a successful
plaintiff in a trespass to try title claim will obtain quiet title and the right
155. Id. at 387.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 388 (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009);
City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)).
162. Id. at 390.
163. Id. at 391-93.
164. Id. at 396 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (West 2008)).
165. Id. at 391 (quoting Porretto v. Patterson, 251 S.W.3d 701, 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).
166. Id.
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a successful takings claim entiof possession to the property in question,
167
tles the claimant to compensation.
In this case, with its determination of navigability, the TPWD identified the waterway in question as belonging to the State of Texas. 168 As
the Sawyer Trust itself noted in its pleadings, the state had "wrongfully
claimed title" to the streambed. 169 Moreover, the Sawyer Trust did not
seek compensation. Instead it only sought declaratory and injunctive relief to determine its ownership of and right to possess the subject waterway. 170 The only question before the court, therefore, was who owns the
property, and the only remedy available to the Sawyer Trust was title and
possession, meaning the Sawyer Trust did not have a constitutional takings claim for compensation. 171 Accordingly, because the Texas legislature has not waived sovereign immunity "by clear and unambiguous
language" for trespass to try title claims against the state, the claims by
the Sawyer Trust against the TPWD remained subject to the limitations
172
of sovereign immunity.
Nevertheless, the supreme court did not close the door on the Sawyer
Trust's claims entirely. In fact, the court confirmed that, on remand, the
trust should be afforded the opportunity to amend and cure its pleading
to proceed in its suit against the appropriate government officials. 173 Because the legislature has not waived sovereign immunity for a trespass to
try title claim, the Sawyer Trust must demonstrate that the claim was subject to some exception from sovereign immunity, such as a determination
that the TPWD acted outside the scope of its authority. By bringing the
trespass to try title claim against an individual state official versus the
agency, the suit would not be barred by sovereign immunity where the
174
official acted ultra vires.
Given the circumstances, a successful ultra vires claim would rest on
demonstrating that the TPWD inappropriately determined the subject
waterway is navigable. Under Texas law, the TPWD does have authority
to make determinations regarding navigability of streams and to exercise
the state's rights over navigable streambeds.175 Its determination is not
conclusive, however, as the supreme court has established that "the question of navigability is, at bottom, a judicial one."1 76 Where, upon judicial
review, it is determined that a government official acting in his official
capacity made an incorrect determination of navigability and possesses
the subject property without authority, the possession is not legally that
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 393 (citing State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1961)).
Id. at 394.
Id. (citing State v. Bradford, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1070 (Tex. 1932)).
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of the sovereign and the defendant official's claim of title will not bar
suit.1 77
VII.

CONCLUSION

Discussions of environmental law in Texas in the coming years are
likely to be dominated by the series of high-profile challenges undertaken
by the State of Texas against various regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. The impact of these challenges, and
any decisions that might result, cannot be denied. As the preceding cases
illustrate, however, in the shadow of these challenges, Texas courts continue to hand down decisions that have important impacts on the form of
environmental regulation in Texas, and the steps the regulated community must take in its day-to-day operations to comply with those
regulations.

177. Id. at 393 (citing Lain, 349 S.W.2d at 581-83).
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